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This paper takes a general look at
the practical requirements for
securing electronic signatures in
both the physical as well as the
electronic domains. It suggests that,
whilst digital signatures have an
important role to play in ensuring
the security within the electronic
domain, consideration also needs to
be given to security in the physical
world.  Also, it is suggested that
security applied to electronic
signatures should be cost effective
with a balanced approach to all 
the risks.
Background
Ever since their discovery, public key techniques
and digital signatures have been considered as one
of the prime means of providing the electronic
equivalent to a physical signature on a piece of
paper. Early United States state legislation gave
specific recognition to the use of digital signatures.
However, latterly the United States has moved to a
more general approach, as illustrated in the US
Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7003,
in which the term electronic signature is defined, in
section 106 (5) as: “an electronic sound, symbol,
or process, attached to or logically associated with
a contract or other record and executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
record.”
The European Union Directive,1 and European
legislation following the Directive has a dual
approach. First, it recognises a specific “qualified”
form of electronic signature that in its practical
realisation is based upon the use of digital
signatures, supported by a “qualified” certificate,
and a smart card device use to hold the signing
key. The second alternative, referred to in article
5.2 of the EU Directive, is neutral in the form an
electronic signature can take, based on the
definition of the general term electronic signature
as provided for in article 2(1) “data in electronic
form which are attached to or logically associated
with other electronic data and which serve as a
method of authentication”.
In some European countries where there has
been significant government support for the
adoption of digital signature technology, there has
been some acceptance of the use of smart cards
with digital signatures.2 However, the use of
digital signatures has yet to have a significant
effect on the general on-line electronic commerce
market, where the additional costs associated with
the use of digital signatures and smart cards have
to show clear benefits before being taken up.
Often retailers will use a simple ‘click’ button
supported by some private information such as
mother’s maiden name as sufficient to indicate
agreement to some legal conditions or a contract.
The use of such very basic authentication
techniques is clearly open to abuse. Once such
private information is given to a site that is later
found to be fraudulent or operates lax security, it
can no longer be considered private. This concern
with minimising costs is leaving users open to
significant risks.
At the moment there is no mid-point between
digital signature technology that can be expensive
to deploy and operate, and leaving users with only
very basic protection. It is suggested that there is a
need for a means of applying signatures that are
cheaper to deploy and operate than the use of
digital signatures supported by smart cards, but
has a greater degree of security than the very basic
“click to agree” mechanisms.
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1 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community
framework for electronic signatures (OJ 19.1.2000 L13/12).
2 For instance, see Ing. Franco Ruggieri, ‘A technician’s views on the digital signature in Italy’, e-Signature Law Journal,
2005, Volume 2 Number 1, 53 – 59.
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Considering the physical as
well as electronic domain 
Current considerations regarding the
requirements for security of electronic signatures,
such as specified in the EU Directive, gives detailed
regard to the signature in the electronic domain,
but little thought to the physical world. The
authentication provided by techniques such as
digital signatures needs to be related to physical
people. Signing keys are only an abstract sequence
of bits, and they need to be securely linked to the
physical person who owns the key. Similarly,
digitally signed electronic documents are also only
an abstract sequence of bits, they in turn need to
be converted to something directly visible that a
human can understand. The action of signing
needs to be under the control of the signatory so
that it can be used to indicate the intention of 
the signatory.
In considering the security of an electronic
signature in a holistic way, it is necessary to
address a range of issues as identified below:
Authentication of the signatory
In order for an electronic signature to be shown to
belong to a specific individual, it is necessary to
authenticate the signatory. There are three aspects of
a human that are commonly used for authentication:
n Something I have: A smart card or some
token, a computer or smart telephone or
some other object owned by the person being
authenticated.
n Something I know: A password, PIN code or
some secret known only to the person being
authenticated. This can include basic
knowledge such as a mother’s maiden name.
n Something I am: Biometric features such as
fingerprints, facial features or retina scan.
Each of these classes of authentication has their
own drawbacks. Something I have can be stolen
and used by someone else. Something I know can
be revealed to someone else. Whilst biometric
features cannot be easily copied in the physical
domain, once converted to the electronic domain
they are just a string of numbers that can be easily
replicated.
So-called ‘strong’ methods for authenticating
users often combine at least two of the above. For
example, smart cards (something I have) are
generally only acceptable if provided with a PIN
(something I know). However, it should be noted
that such strong techniques could have significant
cost implications over simpler techniques such as
authentication based on just something I know
(for example, passwords). Also, it should be noted
that when used for digital signatures, although the
private signing key in the card may be what is
used to sign electronically, it is really the physical
device and the PIN that authenticate the user.
What the signatory sees is
what they sign
When signing a document, signatories do not
sign the document blind. They need to see the
document to know that it is acceptable before
applying a signature to indicate, for example, their
agreement. The document stored electronically
and sent to the recipient generally should properly
represent the information as seen by the user. This
should include the formatting of the information.
Thus the document should be stored in a form
that properly represents the formatted document
as seen.
As an aside, the term ‘viewed’ can be taken as
audible as well than a visible representation of a
document. Where a viewer converts a document
to spoken words, this may be considered as
viewing the document in audible form. In such
cases, it may be necessary to record that signed
document was ‘viewed’ in audible form to avoid
any ambiguity over what is being signed.
This requirement implies first, that the method
of encoding the data should include explicit
formatting so there can be no issue over what is
seen. The Adobe Acrobat PDF format is a good
example of an encoding technique that
unambiguously defines the format and layout of
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the data. This is less so with Word that depends to
an extent of the layout of the users printer. The
HTML web format language is also generally good,
although the layout can vary due to the local
browser settings. However, the XML data encoding
technique on its own does not include formatting,
and so requires the addition of a ‘style-sheet’
when signed to ensure that the property of “what
is seen is what is signed” is preserved in the
encoding of the data.
Another issue that needs to be considered is the
use of scripts within the document. Such scripts
significantly increase the risk of the encoded
document being viewed differently if different
situations. Most modern encoding techniques
(PDF, HTML, Word) include scripting facilities.
Wherever possible, signed documents should avoid
the inclusion of any scripts, and whenever signed
documents are being viewed which contain scripts,
the application should give the user a warning
that, because of the use of scripts, it may not be
guaranteed that the document is viewed as
originally signed.
Finally, there needs to be some assurance that
the software on the users personal computer is
operating correctly and that there is no rogue or
malicious software that affects the document
display. This is discussed later in this paper.
Indication of intent
Whilst intent is not explicitly identified as a
requirement in the EU Directive, unlike its US
counterpart, if a signature is to be used to indicate
agreement, there needs to be some control over
the act of signature creation. This could be
through the clicking of an ‘I agree’ button or 
some other user input into the application which
applies the signature, or through the same means
as used for authentication. When using a smart
card and PIN, the entry of the PIN can be used to
indicate intent.
Integrity protection within the
electronic environment 
For a signed document to be sent and held by
other parties for later use as proof of agreement,
the integrity of the signature with the document
needs to be maintained. If either party disputes the
document signature or its content, some means of
proof that the integrity of the document has been
preserved must be shown.
Digital signatures are probably the best
mechanism for doing this, although not the only
one. The significant advantage of digital signatures
is that only one element of the signing
environment needs to be kept absolutely secure:
the private key. Once protected with a digital
signature, the data can be distributed and copied,
and any tampering is immediately evident. The
main impediment to the use of digital signatures
appears to be the costs and management
overhead involved in putting the infrastructure into
place to provide keys securely to those who wish
to sign.
Other techniques exist which can be used to
provide proof of the integrity of data in the
electronic environment. This commonly involves 
a trusted third party to provide the necessary
integrity protection. This can include use of 
time-stamping, electronic notary services and
electronic seals.
Viewing and validating
Any party relying on the document or providing
adjudication on the validity of the document needs
to have some assurance that the document being
viewed is an authentic signed document. This
requires assurance that:
n There is some visible indication that the
protection applied in the electronic domain
confirms integrity and authenticity of the
document after it has been signed.
n There is some means of tracing back to some
physical authentication of the signatory and
the ‘intent to sign’ bound in some way to the
electronic mechanism. For example, there is a
digital certificate which links the public signing
key to a person who purports to have sole
control over the public key. However, again it
should be recognised that this is not the only
means of authenticating the signatory. An
alternative approach would be to bind some
means of authentication, a biometric
information or one-time password, into the
document.
n The document is displayed to the relying party
or adjudicator in a way that conveys the same
information as shown to the signatory.
Personal computer security
Perhaps the greatest security vulnerability lies in
the platform used by the signatory and the party
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viewing and relying on the signed document. 
Even if high security smart devices and keys are
used for digital signatures, if the security of the
environment that displays the document and
applies the signature is uncertain, its validity can be
open to dispute. Even in commercial environments
with good security practices, there have been
occurrences of malicious software such as viruses
that have widely infected their IT systems.
Thinking outside the
conventional digital signature
box 
Given that even with the use of high security
cards and strong signature algorithms, there
remains significant risk, a more cost effective
solution is worthy of attention. There exist a 
range of alternative technologies that warrant
consideration.
n Biometrics
Biometrics have the considerable advantage of
being strongly linked to an individual person.
Fingerprints and such like are very good for
authenticating an individual in the physical
domain. However, once biometric features are in
an electronic form, they are like any piece of
electronic information, subject to misuse. Once in
an electronic form, they need protection to bind
them securely to the signed document. Digital
signatures can have a useful role to play here, but
this form of signature need not necessary belong
to an individual, but rather a trusted device which
binds the biometrics as a signature on behalf of
the user.
n One-time passwords
One-time passwords, as the name implies, can
only be used once. For example, they can be
created automatically from a special purpose hand
held device, or for infrequent use for special
purposes provided in printed form. Coutts & Co
the bankers in the United Kingdom use a mixture
of one-time passwords with two-factor
authentication, and JP Morgan Chase are working
with RSA security on the use of one-time
passwords for signing. A one-time password has a
significant advantage over simple passwords, in
that once a password has been used for a specific
purpose, it cannot be re-used. Whilst the threats
are less in the electronic domain than with
biometric solutions, the use of third party
signatures or time-stamps would minimise the
threats of misuse.
n Use of existing personal devices 
Smart telephones or other personal devices,
whilst not being as secure as special purpose smart
card devices, have the advantage as already being
‘something I have’ which users are likely to take
great care that the device remains in their personal
possession.
n Third party digital signing
services 
Devices that apply signatures on behalf of users
can be a cost effective way of ensuring that data is
protected whilst in the electronic domain. A range
of such devices exists, including time-stamping
servers, digital notaries, and electronic seals. Whilst
they do not directly authenticate the source, they
can be used to bind authentication data (such as
one-time passwords) to the document, and in
some cases provide indirect authentication.
n Signature gateway
A signature gateway provides a conduit
between special purpose forms of signature (for
instance, based on biometrics) to more widely
recognised form of signature. For example, such a
gateway may take a biometric signature applied
locally, and counter-sign the document on behalf
of the original signatory, using a standard form of
digital signature.
Conclusions
A number of potential alternative mechanisms
for providing electronic signatures have been
outlined in the discussions above. The use of
digital signatures is becoming well established
where the support is available to set up the
necessary infrastructure. However, consideration
should be given to the use of alternative
mechanisms that are more cost effective. In
addition, it should be recognised that even with
the use of digital signature and smart card
technologies, there can remain a number of
security issues to be addressed. The major risks
that may remain on any unsecured platform which
is used to view and sign documents, may negate
any benefits gained from using secure signature
mechanisms instead of much simpler and cheaper
techniques. n
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SECURING ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
70 DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE LAW REVIEW www.deaeslr.org
© Nick Pope, 2005
Nick Pope is an independent consultant in IT
security who has been working on electronic
signatures over a number of years. He is co-
chair of the OASIS Digital Signature Services
technical committee, lead expert on European
Certificate Policy standardisation and a
member of the editorial board of the Journal.
pope@secstan.com
